A Formal Taxonomy of Privacy in Voting Protocols

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First IEEE International Workshop on Security and Forensics in Communication Systems, Ottawa, Canada June 15, 2012


Electronic voting machines...



... are used all over the world

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Internet voting



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Security Requirements

Fairness

Individual Verifiability

Eligibility

Universal Verifiability

Security Requirements

Vote-Independence


Privacy

Receipt-Freeness

Robustness

Coercion-Resistance

Security Requirements



How to secure electronic voting?

Idea: Use formal methods to find bugs and increase confidence

- Need for formal definitions
- Lots of related work: [?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?]...

Ideally we need definitions that

- can be applied on any protocol
- are comparable
- include known threats: coercion, vote-buying, vote-copying, forced abstention
- are suitable for automation





2 Definitions: Four Dimensions

- Communication
- Vote-Independence
- Forced Abstention
- Knowledge about honest voters
- 3 Analysis and Case Studies

4 Conclusion

Communication Vote-Independence Forced Abstention Knowledge about honest voters

Plan



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Four Dimensions

- Communication: Vote-Privacy (VP), Receipt-Freeness (RF), Coercion-Resistance (CR)
- Vote-Independence: Outsider (O), Insider (I)
- Forced Abstention Attacks: Participation Only (PO), Security against Forced-Abstention-Attacks (FA)
- Knowledge about honest voters: Exists Behavior (EB), Any Behavior (AB)

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2 Definitions: Four Dimensions

Communication


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Main idea: Observational equivalence between two situations.



Alice Bob

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The Applied Pi Calculus [?]

Syntax	
P, Q, R :=	processes
0	null process
P Q	parallel composition
! <i>P</i>	replication
ν n.P	restriction ("new")
if $M=N$ then P else Q	conditional
in(u, x).P	message input
out(u, x).P	message output
$\{M/x\}$	active substitution

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Vote-Privacy: The formal definition

Definition (Vote-Privacy)

A voting process respects *Vote-Privacy (VP)* if for all votes σ_{v_A} and σ_{v_B} we have

 $VP'\left[V\sigma_{id_{A}}\sigma_{f_{A}}\sigma_{v_{A}}|V\sigma_{id_{B}}\sigma_{f_{B}}\sigma_{v_{B}}\right]\approx_{I} VP'\left[\sigma_{id_{A}}\sigma_{f_{A}}\sigma_{v_{B}}|V\sigma_{id_{B}}\sigma_{f_{B}}\sigma_{v_{A}}\right]$

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Receipt-Freeness (RF)

Again: Observational equivalence between two situations, but Alice tries to create a receipt or a fake.






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
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Coercion-Resistance (CR)


Observational equivalence between two situations, but Alice is under control by Mallory or only pretends to be so.



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Coercion-Resistance (CR)

Observational equivalence between two situations, but Alice is under control by Mallory or only pretends to be so.



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Vote-Independence


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Insider (I) vs. Outsider (O)


Main idea: Privacy, but with a voter under control of the attacker. If he can relate his vote to e.g. Alice's vote, Mallory can distinguish both sides.



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
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Can we combine Vote-Independence with Receipt-Freeness?


"Receipt-Freeness with Chuck":



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
"Receipt-Freeness with Chuck":



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And with Coercion-Resistance?


"Coercion-Resistance with Chuck":



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And with Coercion-Resistance?

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
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Security against Forced Abstention Attacks (FA) vs. Participation Only (PO)

Alice abstains or votes in turn with Bob:

Alice Bob




Communication Vote-Independence Forced Abstention Knowledge about honest voters

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
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Introducing Fakes: Exists Behavior (EB) vs. Any Behavior (AB)


Some protocols use fake votes [?] to achieve Receipt-Freeness and Coercion-Restistance.



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
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Relations among the notions



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Plan



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- Generalized model
- New modular definition
- Includes known threats
- Hierarchy of notions
- Allows fine-grained comparison of different types of protocols
- Can be automatically verified using existing tools (within certain complexity limits)

Future Work

- Automate and/or automatically verify more of the proofs
- Computational definition

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

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Existing definitions

- [?, ?]: Tailored to a specific protocol
- [?, ?]: Unsuitable for protocol by Juels/Civitas
- [?, ?]: Vote-Independence based on definitions by [?, ?]
- [?]: Coercion Resistance, very fine-grained \rightarrow difficult to compare
- [?]: Privacy as unlinkability, unsuitable for automated verification

• . . .

Case Studies

Protocol	Priv. Notion	Comments
Juels et al. [?]	CR ^{I,FA,EB}	Requires fakes to achieve CR
Bingo Voting [?]	CR ^{I,PO,AB}	Trusted voting machine
- variant	CR ^{I,FA,AB}	Secure against forced abstention
Lee et al. [?]	CR ^{O,PO,AB}	Vulnerable to vote-copying
Okamoto [?]	RF ^{1,PO,AB}	Based on trap-door commitments
- variant	RF ^{1,FA,AB}	Private channel to administrator
Fujioka et al. [?]	VP ^{I,PO,AB}	Based on blind signatures
- variant	VP ^{I,PO,AB}	Permits multiple votes
Simp. Voting Prot.	VP ^{O,PO,AB}	Vulnerable to vote-copying

Modeling a voting protocol

Definition (Voting Protocol)

A voting protocol is a tuple of processes (V, A_1, \ldots, A_m) where V is the process that is executed by the voter, and the A_j 's are the processes executed by the election authorities.

Definition (Voting Process)

A voting process of a voting protocol (V, A_1, \ldots, A_m) is a closed plain process

$$VP = \nu \tilde{n}.(V\sigma_{id_1}\sigma_{f_1}\sigma_{v_1}|\ldots|V\sigma_{id_n}\sigma_{f_n}\sigma_{v_n}|A_1|\ldots|A_l)$$

We define an evaluation context VP' which is like VP, but has a hole instead of two $V\sigma_i$.

Definition (Process P^{ch} [?])

Let P be a process and ch be a channel. We define P^{ch} as follows:

- 0^{ch} $\hat{=}$ 0,
- $(P|Q)^{ch} \stackrel{ch}{=} P^{ch}|Q^{ch}$,
- $(\nu n.P)^{ch} \doteq \nu n.out(ch, n).P^{ch}$ when n is a name of base type,

•
$$(\nu n.P)^{ch} \stackrel{.}{=} \nu n.P^{ch}$$
 otherwise,

- $(in(u, x).P)^{ch} = in(u, x).out(ch, x).P^{ch}$ when x is a variable of base type,
- $(in(u, x).P)^{ch} = in(u, x).P^{ch}$ otherwise,
- $(\operatorname{out}(u, M).P)^{ch} \doteq \operatorname{out}(u, M).P^{ch}$,
- $(!P)^{ch} \triangleq !P^{ch}$,
- (if M = N then P else Q)^{ch} \doteq if M = N then P^{ch} else Q^{ch} .

Definition (Process P^{c_1,c_2} [?])

Let P be a process, c_1 , c_2 channels. We define P^{c_1,c_2} as follows:

- $0^{c_1,c_2} \doteq 0$,
- $(P|Q)^{c_1,c_2} \triangleq P^{c_1,c_2}|Q^{c_1,c_2}$,
- $(\nu n.P)^{c_1,c_2} \triangleq \nu n.out(c_1,n).P^{c_1,c_2}$ if n is a name of base type,

•
$$(\nu n.P)^{c_1,c_2} \doteq \nu n.P^{c_1,c_2}$$
 otherwise

- (in(u, x).P)^{c₁,c₂} = in(u, x).out(c₁, x).P^{c₁,c₂} if x is a variable of base type & x is a fresh variable,
- $(in(u, x).P)^{c_1, c_2} = in(u, x).P^{c_1, c_2}$ otherwise,
- $(out(u, M).P)^{c_1, c_2} = in(c_2, x).out(u, x).P^{c_1, c_2}$,
- $(!P)^{c_1,c_2} \triangleq !P^{c_1,c_2}$,

a constant

• (if M = N then P else Q)^{$c_1, c_2 = in(c_2, x)$.if x = true then P^{c_1, c_2} else Q^{c_1, c_2} where x is a fresh variable and true is}

Definition (Process $A^{\text{out}(ch,\cdot)}$ [?])

Let A be an extended process. We define the process $A^{\operatorname{out}(ch,\cdot)}$ as $\nu ch.(A|\operatorname{in}(ch,x))$.

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Definition (Equivalence in a Frame)

Two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ , written $(M = N)\phi$, if and only if $\phi \equiv \nu \tilde{n}.\sigma$, $M\sigma = N\sigma$, and $\{\tilde{n}\} \cap (fn(M) \cup fn(N)) = \emptyset$ for some names \tilde{n} and some substitution σ .

Definition (Static Equivalence (\approx_s))

Two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent, written $\phi \approx_s \psi$, when dom $(\phi) =$ dom (ψ) and when for all terms M and N $(M = N)\phi$ if and only if $(M = N)\psi$. Two extended processes Aand B are statically equivalent $(A \approx_s B)$ if their frames are statically equivalent.

Definition (Labelled Bisimilarity (\approx_l))

Labelled bisimilarity is the largest symmetric relation \mathcal{R} on closed extended processes, such that $A \mathcal{R} B$ implies

A ≈_s B,
if A → A', then B → B' and A' R B' for some B',
if A → A' and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = Ø, then B →^{*} → * B' and A' R B' for some B'.